

American Presbyterians and



THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

by Paul A. Hopkins

PRESBYTERIANS HAVE A LONG connection to the Middle East. From 1819 until 1870, Presbyterians joined Congregational missionaries in service to the Middle East as members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Although Presbyterians created their own board for Foreign Missions in 1837, that Board waited until 1870 before taking responsibility for the Levant at which time the Congregational Church concentrated their efforts mainly in Turkey. The United Presbyterian Church of North America (UPNA) began work in Egypt in 1854. The Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS), which separated from the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (PCUSA) during the Civil War, did not maintain an active missionary involvement in the Middle East.

Because of this history, and particularly after the UPNA united with the PCUSA to form the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (UPC) in 1958, Presbyterians were frequently referred to as a "pro-Arab" church.¹ Coupled with this is an implication of, at the best, disinterest in Jews threatened by the Nazis in Europe.² This paper will seek to look at the record of Presbyterian, and where applicable, Presbyterian involvement in ecumenical efforts related to Jewish refugees during the Nazi period. It will also attempt to show the motivations behind our Middle East policy statement adopted in 1974 as well as

later peacemaking efforts in that troubled area.

This will not be a comprehensive statement regarding Middle East affairs: it will be limited to these two areas which have frequently put us as a denomination in conflict with Jewish organizations which act in defense of Israel—regardless of that State's actions. Presbyterians and Jewish defense organizations have had an interesting relationship. On many matters of social justice, state-church relations, and international affairs we have worked closely together. It is around Israel that our relationship becomes testy. Until recently, only a few Presbyterians—and probably fewer Jews—understood why things fall apart on that one issue. It is important to look back on the record in order to shed some light on this sensitive subject.

I

During the period before World War II, the Middle East was of little political concern to the United States. The Ottoman Turks held sway there up until the first World War and following that Britain and France became the dominant powers. When colonialism collapsed after the second World War, the United States, the new Superpower, moved in to fill the vacuum created by the departure of former colonial powers.

Paul Hopkins served as Secretary, Overseas Mission Africa, and as Secretary, Overseas Mission Middle East, in the Program Agency UPCUSA. He is now retired.

In those earlier years Presbyterians seemed to be able to separate concern for the spiritual well-being of the people to whom missionaries were sent from their political well-being. General Assemblies record very few utterances on international affairs. A survey of the *Deliverances of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. 1910-1945*, bearing the sub-title *On the Issues of Social and Moral Welfare*, records only eight pages out of 143 pages total related to peace and international relations. Most of the entries concerned World War II issues.³ An example of this bifurcation of concerns is that one of the first references to colonialism was in 1946 when the General Assembly urged "the President and Congress to support a policy that looks toward the constituting of the former colonies of the Axis powers as either United Nation trusteeships or collective trusteeships . . . (which) will give hope of early self-government independence."⁴

In 1891, William Eugene Blackstone, a Methodist layman, presented a petition to President Benjamin Harrison, a Presbyterian. It took cognizance of the oppression of Russian Jews and argued that Palestine should be given to them. He was moved in part by his literal interpretation of Scripture, and in part by "the need to do something lest teeming crowds of immigrants would make life too uncomfortable for American society . . ."⁵ Blackstone's Memorial, as it was called, predated Hertzl's First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, by six years. In 1916, the Presbyterian General Assembly adopted an Overture mentioning the Blackstone Memorial, and petitioning the President of the United States "in behalf of the persecuted Jews of Europe," to call "an international conference of the Powers" to consider the conditions of the Jews, and to adopt such measures as may be deemed wise and best for their permanent relief."⁶ In thus supporting the Blackstone Memorial, no consideration was given to the indigenous people of Palestine or to their inherent right of

self-determination.

President Woodrow Wilson, another active Presbyterian layman, later said, "To think that I, the son of the manse, should be able to help restore the Holy Land to its people."⁷ While Wilson had Jewish Zionist friends who were encouraging him to support the British Government's Balfour Declaration (establishing Palestine as a national home for the Jewish people), the record shows that other Jewish friends were anti-Zionist. In addition his Secretary of State, Presbyterian Robert Lansing, strongly opposed the British declaration. Yet it was Wilson's subjective, sentimental understanding of Scripture which caused him to affirm the British policy. Lansing's evident anti-semitism in his statement opposing the Balfour Declaration did not help his argument.⁸

During this period a close friend and Princeton classmate of President Wilson, Cleveland H. Dodge, a co-religionist who had been one of the main financial supporters of Wilson's two presidential election campaigns, actively worked with Middle East missionary colleagues who were seeking the establishment of an American protectorate over greater Syria. Arab gratitude for the benevolent work of American Christian missions, and Wilson's own well-publicized views of self-determination for colonial people, had caused the Arab people to see America as their best path to independence. The effort failed. While this effort aroused considerable support among the Middle East missionary community, it seems to have failed to stir the church at large.

In 1933 as Hitler's Third Reich began to show its teeth to its Jewish citizens, 1200 Protestant clergy in North America published a Manifesto stating:


"We Christian ministers are greatly distressed at the situation of our Jewish brethren in Germany. In order to leave no room for doubt as to our feelings on this subject, we consider it an imperative duty to raise our voices in indignant and sorrowful protest against the pitiless persecution to which the Jews are subjected under Hitler's rule."

After admitting to the religious and racial prejudices existing in America "against which we have repeatedly protested," the Manifesto continued:

We are convinced that the efforts made by Nazis to humiliate an entire section of the human family, are liable to cast the civilized world back into the clutches of medieval barbarism. "We deplore the consequences which may ensue for the Jews and also for Christianity which tolerates this barbarous persecution, and more particularly, for Germany herself. We are convinced that in thus protesting against Hitler's cruel anti-semitism we are acting as sincere friends of the German nation."⁹

In November 1935, the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (FCCCA) published a statement protesting that Germany's treatment of the Jews "is unworthy of a great nation. . . . We protest against this policy because the philosophy on which it is based is a heathen philosophy. . . . It is an attempt of a tribal heathen movement, based on race, blood, and soil, to separate Christianity from its historical origin and a Christian nation from its religious past."¹⁰ In October 1939 the Executive Committee called for a day of prayer to be held on November 20 for the suffering and the refugees—a call in which the Roman Catholic Church and Jewish Organizations quickly joined. In connection with this day of prayer the FCCCA issued "an appeal to all church people to respond generously to the efforts for the relief of refugees as carried on by the American Committee for Christian German Refugees and also by the Catholic and Jewish Organizations."¹¹ The PCUSA participated in all these deliberations and actions as an active member and contributor to the FCCCA. Throughout this period under review many of the FCCCA leadership were Presbyterians.

On April 8, 1938 President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a telegram to a "small number of persons" asking that they meet with him on April 13 in the Executive Office to "undertake a preliminary consideration of the most effective manner in which pri-



Board of National Missions
Jewish Refugee Appeal, 1939

vate individuals and organizations within the United States can cooperate with this government in the work to be undertaken by The International Committee which will shortly be created to facilitate the emigration of political refugees from Austria and Germany."¹²

At the meeting the President spoke of the acceptance of other governments to meet at his request and form an International Committee on Refugees to find ways to respond to meet the crisis of European refugees. He explained that "the problem of securing the funds for carrying out whatever plans the international conference may adopt will have to be met by private individuals and organizations, and he expressed the hope that the group whom he had invited to the White House would be willing to serve as a permanent committee of an advisory sort," although

the work of the group would be to mediate between "the international commission and the various administrative organizations carrying on relief programs for the refugees."¹³ When asked why money could not be obtained by government appropriation, the "President replied, with a touch of humor, that that would require congressional action and that he did not seem to be very successful in getting congressional action." He further indicated that "at least for the present" it would be unwise to start a public dispute with regard to a change in the immigration quotas. Despite these handicaps the President was anxious to do whatever was possible to help the victims.¹⁴

Among those present at this meeting were Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, who would serve as liaison with the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Rt. Rev. Michael J. Ready of the Catholic Bishops Committee. The Rev. Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the FCCCA and a Presbyterian, was to be the liaison with the American Committee for Christian German Refugees. While the International Conference and the President's Advisory Council broke no new ground in overcoming quota restrictions in Canada and the United States, it did provide opportunities for immigration in several Latin American countries and over the war years served the President as an ear to the refugee calamity and the ability to intervene in crisis situations. Significantly it also brought the efforts of the three religious groups into a more intimate working relationship in their humanitarian work.¹⁵

Due to this close cooperation, the FCCCA set up a program for reception of refugees, "both Christian and Jewish," in Protestant churches across America.¹⁶ In February, 1940, the United Jewish Appeal for Refugees made a gift of \$125,000 to the FCCCA "as an acknowledgment on our part of the sympathy and support of the leaders of the Protestant Churches for all victims of religious and racial persecution."¹⁷ In January 1939 leaders of the

Catholic and Protestant churches delivered a petition to President Roosevelt calling for admission to the United States of German children because "protest, however vigorous, and sympathy, however deep, are not enough, and that these must translate themselves into such action as shall justify faith."¹⁸

At the May 1939 General Assembly of the PCUSA, the Commissioners heard a report on Nazi treatment of the Jews and on growing anti-Semitism in America, and adopted the following resolution:

"We learn with deep sorrow of the continued persecution of the Jewish people in other lands. Our hearts go out in sincerest sympathy to these victims of fanatical hatred and brutal oppression. Moreover, we view with profound misgivings the evidence of a growing anti-Semitism in America. We believe that the Christian Church dare not be silent in the presence of anti-Semitic propaganda. We urge that anti-Semitism be combated aggressively in our Churches, by informing people as to the truth about the Jewish race, by laying renewed emphasis upon the Christian principle of human brotherhood and by encouraging fellowship between Jews and Christians."¹⁹

The same Assembly requested the Board of National Missions (BNM) to launch a special appeal for funds "on behalf of Jews and Non-Aryans. . . . Through no fault of their own they are being deprived of occupation, impoverished and forced to flee. They are slowly and inexorably being annihilated by a process which is unbelievably brutal and which involves the most refined torture of the human soul."²⁰

In 1940, the Board of National Missions (BNM) reported to the General Assembly

Jewish refugee work deals with a people whose rootlessness derives . . . from a deliberate uprooting by the . . . Nazi regime, and, like freshly dug roots flung up to die, these men, women, and children have been thrown on the charity of the world. Small charity have they received. In Palestine new limitations on land purchases by Jews, following drastic curtailment of Jewish immigration, strike a severe blow to the dreams of those who would have seen Palestine a refuge for Jews. America, the "asylum of the persecuted," has admitted only 75,000 refu-

gees since 1933 . . . No country has welcomed them . . . hundred upon hundreds are wanderers, refused asylum at port after port, living in a nightmare of uncertainty and utter despair.²¹

In September and October 1942, Samuel Cavert visited France and Switzerland. He was asked by the Director of the World Jewish Congress to try to determine, as had been reported, that deportation by Nazis really meant extermination. Cavert confirmed the report by cable.²² That disclosure led to the following resolution on anti-Semitism adopted at the Biennial Assembly of the Federal Council on December 11

The reports which are reaching us concerning the incredible cruelties toward the Jews in Nazi occupied countries, particularly Poland, stir the Christian people of America to the deepest sympathy and indignation. It is impossible to avoid a conclusion that something like a policy of deliberate extermination of the Jews in Europe is being carried out. The violence and inhumanity which Nazi leaders have publicly avowed toward all Jews are apparently now coming to a climax in a virtual massacre. We are resolved to do our full part in establishing conditions in which such treatment of the Jews shall end. . . . For those who, after the war, will have to emigrate from the war-ridden lands of Europe, immigration opportunities should be created in this and other lands.²³

On January 6, 1943, the heads of six Jewish organizations which comprise the Synagogue Council of America, met in conference with official representatives of the FCCCA. This report of the meeting appeared in the Federal Council Bulletin of February: "Several fruitful suggestions emerged as to ways in which the Churches might help to develop a stronger support for the needs of refugees from Europe, a measure of relief in the form of food for at least some of the Jews in Europe, and a safe and respected place for Jews in the post-war world."²⁴

On March 16 the Executive Committee urged its Research Department to provide the American Churches with all available evidence concerning the treatment of Jews under the Nazi regime; to urge all

Christian people to give moral support to whatever measures afford promise of rescuing European Jews whose lives are in jeopardy; and to appeal to the government to offer financial assistance for support of refugees that neutral governments may be able to receive and to provide places of temporary asylum to which refugees may be removed for the duration of the war, with the understanding that they "will then be repatriated or be provided with permanent homes in other ways."²⁵

The commissioners to the 1943 General Assembly called upon the Church to "protest against the wholesale and ruthless persecution of Jews now going on in the many lands of Europe under Nazi domination . . . to give all possible aid to those who are the victims of this legalized anti-Semitism, and to urge unceasingly all possible Government action . . . here and abroad, to assure the rescue of as many of the European Jews as possible from their threatened complete annihilation and extermination."²⁶ The same year the General Assembly of the UPNA stated: "We wish to record our utter abhorrence of the cruel and senseless persecutions of God's ancient people, the Jews, in all lands dominated by the Axis powers. We would urge our people to oppose faithfully every manifestation of Anti-Semitism and to continue in importunate prayer for these brethren of our Lord according to the flesh."²⁷

Despite such leadership there continued to exist in American society the virus of anti-semitism. Whether it was the aftermath of the spiels in the thirties of Fr. Charles E. Coughlin on radio from the Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Michigan, or the attempt by Henry Ford, a decade earlier, to give credence in his *Dearborn Independent* to the long discredited *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, anti-semitism—enhanced by a still recovering depression—was alive and well in American society.

The efforts of the Christian churches to open America's door for European refu-

gees fell on deaf ears in the Congress. Nathan C. Belth states

The hardening of anti-Semitic attitudes at the beginning of the war had most serious consequences for efforts to rescue European Jewry from Nazi extermination. As it had all through the 1930's, Congress, responding to public sentiment and its own reluctance, closed its ears to pleas for emergency admission of refugees fleeing for their lives. It blocked every effort at legislative relief. The national origins immigration law now bore its bitterest fruit.²⁸

It was in the face of this atmosphere that the General Assembly of 1940 stated:

We would also remind ourselves of the pitiable situation on a world-wide scale, and of the tragic anguish and hopelessness of refugees. We call upon our Church to uphold the American tradition of sanctuary for the oppressed and to help our uprooted brothers by prayer and generous giving. . . . We call upon our Government to continue to cooperate fully with other nations in the effort to solve the perplexing world-wide problems of re-establishing refugees.²⁹

The Assembly was running against the national tide. In the summer of 1938 a national poll found that 67 percent opposed the admission of refugees. Nine months later the figure rose to 83 per cent opposed.³⁰ The Assembly continued to press for opening America's doors to European refugees through 1948 at which time they were asking the government to grant 100,000 visas a year for four years.³¹ From the point of view of Jewish refugees, however, it was now too late, the die was cast: the State of Israel was now a reality and Israel was their destination.

II

With the birth of Israel in 1948 and the creation of another mass of refugees from Palestine as a result of the creation of the State of Israel, Presbyterians faced a new challenge to compassion that would eventually bring friction into their warm and close relations with the Jewish community. The Church at large, along with the vast majority of Americans, had been impressed and influenced by what they

thought of as "Little Israel" which had defeated the far more numerous Arab peoples. Biblical images were brought to mind and lay Presbyterians had no trouble applying those images literally to the new state of Israel.³² For the American people as a whole another factor was at work: the horrors of the Holocaust had finally become real; and the great majority which had resisted efforts to break down immigration barriers so that Jews could escape Hitler's extermination efforts, lived with the guilt of the horror of what their anti-semitism had wrought. What was true for Americans was, perhaps, more true for most West Europeans.

Meanwhile, the World Council of Churches (WCC) in cooperation with the Near East Christian Council had begun work among the new Palestinian refugees scattered in crude camps in five countries. The small band of relief workers, later to be known as the Near East Christian Council Committee for Refugee Relief (NECCRR), served in the name of the churches with resources which came through the WCC. It did not take too long for them to understand that the problem they were addressing was far different from what their churches at home thought it to be. Meeting Palestinian people daily, they quickly learned of how they had become victims of a catastrophe for which they were not responsible. They discovered too, that refugees living in make-shift camps and caves, some in desert areas, most with only the food and clothing they received from relief workers, had only one hope left: return to their homes from which they had been driven by the Israelis.

Because some Presbyterian missionaries were involved in this refugee work and reported on conditions to the Board of Foreign Missions (BFM), the Board made this report to the 1949 General Assembly

One of the most acute areas of need for relief in the world lies in the Near East in connection with Palestinian Arab refugees, both Moslem and Christian. In making a home for displaced

Jews, the Israelis have displaced an equal or larger number of Arabs from their ancestral homes, too often by high handed methods. Relief work for these refugees is being carried on by our missionaries in Lebanon and Syria . . . but the problem of rehabilitation remains almost untouched. Strong feelings of injustices and bitterness remain in Arab lands, making missionary work very difficult, but Christian service is helping to remedy the situation.³³

Meanwhile the relief workers were beginning to look for political answers to the problems. The director of the NECCRR found one leading Palestinian lawyer who had ideas for a political solution. Very soon that director was deported by the Jordanian CID. The word went out to the NECCRR staff that they were "not here to solve the Palestine Refugee Problem; they were here to solve the problems of individual refugees."³⁴ Obviously, the solutions were going to have to be found elsewhere and the refugees were not going to have any part in those decisions.

The frustration of these dedicated people was compounded by their knowledge that the churches of Europe and America remained ignorant of the magnitude and urgency of the problems.³⁵ To change the latter and begin to do something about the former, they prevailed upon the Division of Inter-Church Aid and Service to Refugees (DICASR) of the WCC to call a conference on the problem of Arab refugees from Palestine. The conference met in Beirut, Lebanon, in May 1951 under the auspices of the International Missionary Council (IMC) and DICASR/WCC.

The delegates to the conference visited Palestinian refugees in five countries living under "conditions of terrible privations". "The Conference was unanimous in its judgment that whatever may be the form of political settlement finally arrived at, provisions would have to be made for the return of a certain number of refugees to their original homes together with a general plan of compensation for refugees whether they return or not. It was urged that on both counts 'the settlement should be not only just but generous.'³⁶

One of the American delegates appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 26 and stated that "The Morales of the refugees is steadily deteriorating and many show signs of desperation." He further warned that "Economic aid and technical assistance are not enough. . . . Mutual security is derived in larger measure from the spirit of friendship and goodwill between and among the peoples concerned . . ." ³⁷ But little seems to have been accomplished to respond to the hopes of the NECCRR workers.

A second conference was called in May of 1956. It also met in Beirut. In one of the opening speeches, the Rev. Elfan Rees, European Director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) of the WCC, pointed out that the refugees "are one of the most important causes of the continued tensions (in the region) and at the same time the victims of it . . . the stark truth is that while we meet in the same place and under the same auspices, we are not facing the same problem. We are facing a far worse problem."³⁸

The 1956 Conference Statement asserts that the delegates had been made aware of the tragedy of a community which feels itself betrayed and condemned to wait for an end to its suffering without purpose and without hope. . . . A real solution to the problem of these men, women, and children depends, as it must do, on a political settlement, and no progress has yet been made toward this. . . . The people and government of Israel will find their position in the Middle East more acceptable and their expressed desire for peace more convincing if they take the lead in this process. Any constructive move must have its hard implications for either Israel or the Arab States, while it is certain that a full solution will make severe demands on both."³⁹

Both the 1951 and 1956 Beirut Conferences held to the principle that the agencies involved in the refugee relief effort should stay out of politics. After the 1951 conference the churches represented seemed to feel that they, too, should avoid political issues. However, in 1954

the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions reported

No part of the world is more strategically important to the hearts of Christians than Palestine. For six years Israelies (sic) and Arabs have been engaged in guerilla warfare in which hundreds have been killed and injured. . . . all-out war may break out at any time.

In view of the last tragic phase of the Arab-Israel war, which resulted in 750,000 refugees, and in consideration of the progress peace would bring to all the peoples of the Middle East, we urge the State Department to exert its influence in the United Nations to bring Israelies and Arabs together to end this tragic situation. We encourage the United Nations to continue its commendable efforts toward reconciliation.⁴⁰

While Presbyterian and ecumenical leaders in New York continued to make even-handed and comparatively timid efforts to bring this conflict to public attention, reports from Presbyterian Middle East missions were far more urgent. In 1948 a report from the United Mission in Mesopotamia indicated that funds for the defense of Palestine had been collected from a mission girl's school "creating a difficult situation for an institution that desires to maintain a strict neutrality."⁴¹ In 1949 the Syria-Lebanon Mission reported:

The struggle over Palestine has aroused the bitter resentment of the people and the government against the Zionist determination to change Palestine from a predominantly Arab to a strictly Jewish country. Much of the resentment has been directed against the United States which they hold to be largely responsible for the present situation.⁴²

In 1950 the Syria-Lebanon Mission reported an interesting development:

In the summer of 1948 Israel was still referred to as a "so-called state," a fictitious nation which would ultimately be obliterated by a united Arab world. . . . But long before the summer of 1949, quotation marks were removed from the word Israel. The new state was recognized as a fact with which Arab governments must somehow deal, though not on terms of friendship.

Palestine remains the outstanding problem in foreign relations. Israel exists. But what shall be her final boundaries? Will Israel remain within those boundaries? . . . What will be the

future of Arab Palestine? What will be the status of Jerusalem? Above all, what shall be done with the Arab refugees?⁴³

In 1956 the General Assembly noted with commendation the holding of a Conference on Arab Refugees, and urged "our churches and their members to study its findings, as to a long-range solution of the Near East refugee situation."⁴⁴ But following the Suez War at the end of October, the Syria-Lebanon Mission reported: "Long neglect of the Arab-Israeli problem has resulted in chronic fever in the body politic. . . . Time has not proved to be an effective healer. . . . Nothing less than the settlement of the basic problem of Israel will restore health to the Near East."⁴⁵

The delegation to the 1956 Beirut Conference on Palestine Refugees returned and stirred the Division of Foreign Missions (DFM) into action. On September 26-27, 1956, the DFM together with the Church World Service and Division of International Affairs, reported to the General Board of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA (NCCCUSA) on the deteriorating situation of the refugees. The Board after discussing the report reconstituted the Joint Committee on Arab Refugees—a committee which had originally been established following the 1951 Beirut conference but which had fallen into neglect. This committee called as its consultant, Dr. Tracy Strong who had been involved with the resettlement of war prisoners following World War II and later an Executive of the YMCA. In an Interim Report to the Joint Committee, commenting on remarks heard at the Beirut Conference, he mentioned "the necessity of making a sharp distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-semitism;" and an old Arab proverb, "The feeding of a hungry man is no substitute for respect."⁴⁷ As the Joint Committee wrestled with their follow-up responsibilities, these and other concepts apparently began to open up the question of the future of the Palestinian refugees: Did they have the right of self-determination which

other Arab peoples had already exercised? If not, why not? If they did, where was it to be exercised?

Some members of the Joint Committee who had not attended the Beirut Conferences were not altogether happy about the direction in which this committee was heading. One was Clifford Earle who was Secretary for Social Action at the Presbyterian Board of Christian Education (BCE). On February 4, 1957 he wrote to Dr. Kenneth L. Maxwell, Secretary of the NCCCUA Division of Life and Work: "I am deeply concerned about this Committee, and I wish to participate in everything the Committee does. I am really a bit anxious about the one-sidedness of the Committee's bias in the Middle East political issue." Earlier he had participated in an effort to broaden the scope of the committee so that it could be of service in settling Jews in Israel.⁴⁸ Earle had been in Israel in the spring of 1956 and had discussions with Israeli leadership.⁴⁹ Former colleagues remember him as a close friend of the then Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir who had attended the same high school as Earle in Milwaukee where they had grown up.⁵⁰ There is no indication that Earle had visited Palestinian refugee camps during that visit to the Middle East.

A significant factor at this period in the life of the Presbyterian Church was the close working relationship between a number of the staff of the BCE and BNM and the staff of organized Jewish Agencies. In the fifties and the sixties, many of the social issues which were addressed brought the two together in a supporting relationship. While there was no stated Board policy with regard to relations with Jewish Agencies, issues such as separation of church and state, abortion, civil rights and Vietnam found Presbyterian national program agencies and the Jewish Agencies working toward the same goals.

This perspective is indicated in the statement made by a BNM staff person to the International Affairs Office of the NCCCUA. The statement dated Decem-

ber 19, 1968, was entitled "What are the Issues in the Middle East and how are they related?"

It has become abundantly clear that the Arabs hate the West, which to them means British and French colonialism . . . Therefore the Arabs hate Israel . . . Since the Arabs have made it their primary object in life to eject the West from their midst, they are determined to destroy Israel. . . . Egypt's President Nasser and the leaders of the U.S.S.R. . . . have identical objectives: the expulsion of the West from Arab lands. Hence they are allies and the Israelis are their common enemy.⁵¹

This view that the Arabs hated Israel because they associated Israel with colonialism and the West, failed utterly to come to grips with the Palestinians loss of homes and land. For the writer of this statement, relations with the Jewish Agencies were very important and he had worked hard to develop such relations. Those Presbyterians who took a "pro-Arab" position called into question the position of his agency and the UPC; thus he felt it necessary to reach out to Jews and be supportive of them on matters relating to Israel.⁵² Thus while Presbyterians (mostly from the BFM and later the Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations (COEMAR)) wrestled with the findings of the Beirut Conferences and reports from mission stations in the Middle East, the two other program boards of the church had quite different experiences. Because of such differences of views, no action was taken to General Assembly.

An additional impediment to action on the Middle East was the position of Clifford Earle. The Department on Church and Society was established in 1961. It was to be a unit which programmatically related to all three program boards although it continued to be administratively located in the BCE in Philadelphia. Earle became the first Secretary of its Advisory Council on International Affairs (ACIA) and continued to hold that office even though he physically moved to New York in order to work more closely with the United Nations. In his first report to the ACIA dated

August 1, 1962, Earle listed his activities in international affairs which included no mention of Israel, the Near East, or the Palestinians.⁵³

Clifford Earle was a man with a broad vision. He had concerns which ranged from Vietnam to China, South Africa and Latin America. He was deeply concerned about economic assistance to developing nations and worked assiduously to open America's immigration policy. He at one point conducted an ecumenical radio program, *International Corner*, which gave attention to many of the new nations then being born and other matters of importance to the Christian public. He had many friends among the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, but apparently few contacts with those from Arab countries. Like so many talented and creative people, he had far too little time to spend with the committee which was responsible to supervise his work. In 1967 the Office of International Affairs was reorganized and a new secretary appointed.⁵⁴

III

The 1967 June War was a watershed in Jewish-Christian relations. As already indicated the laity of the Presbyterian Church were largely pro-Zionist as a result of the general support of Israel in the American public or because of literalist reading of Scripture. The two national program boards of the church, the BNM and the BCE, tended to be supportive of Israel because of their association with Jewish Agencies in national policy issues. COEMAR was uniquely structured: it had a Division of Ecumenical Mission and a Division of Ecumenical Relations. The latter had responsibility for official relations with Jewish religious organizations as part of its mandate; the former was in close touch with missionaries and refugee relief work in the Middle East. These two factors tended to neutralize each other and kept COEMAR from taking a strong position. The leadership of COEMAR believed that

any statement on the Middle East situation should come from Church and Society which was the responsible body mandated to present policy statements to the General Assembly on international affairs.⁵⁵

During the days leading up to the war, America's Jewish community experienced intense fear that Israel could not stand up to the Arab forces. Reports which COEMAR had received both from relief workers and through ecumenical channels gave a different picture. In Israel, despite the provocations from Syria and the guerilla raids of FATAH, the Palestinian group led by Yasir Arafat, there was confidence and preparedness which was later unleashed as soon as Egypt asked for removal of United Nations peacekeeping forces. As it turned out, COEMAR's understanding of the situation in Israel was in line with that of Abba Eban, at that time Israel's Foreign Minister, who said: "Israel is in a posture of preparedness but not of alarm. Her forces are capable of defending the vital interests and the territory of the State"⁵⁶ Since that time Israel's military leaders have commented on the period and confirmed that judgment.⁵⁷

The new Secretary for International Affairs who took office at this critical moment was Ralph Clark Chandler. He came to the position, by his own admission, with "a fairly typical American attitude about the dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis: whatever might have been the injustice toward the Arabs in 1948, the problem of the displaced Palestinian Arab nation could have been solved . . . had Arab leaders wished to solve it."⁵⁸ In the process of agreeing to Chandler's appointment, John Coventry Smith, General Secretary of COEMAR, had sought and obtained an arrangement by which Chandler would serve simultaneously on the COEMAR staff and be seconded for service to the NCCCUSA as required.⁵⁹

At the same time an urgent effort was begun at the NCCCUSA to prepare a statement on the Middle East crisis. Chandler



John Coventry Smith

was assigned to provide staff services for this effort. In his first draft position paper presented to the Committee on June 22, Chandler argued that meeting human suffering of refugees was not enough: a political solution was necessary and must be worked out in the United Nations. There had to be dialogue between Arabs and Israelis: minimum expectations were for "Arabs to recognize the existence of Israel as a sovereign state" and "Simultaneously Israel must admit some responsibility for the Palestinian refugees living on her side of the present truce lines." Other refugees must be given the means to "psychologically emigrate" so they can settle in new locales.⁶⁰

The final statement adopted by the Executive Committee of the NCCCUSA on July 7 echoed these views. In addition the final document spoke of the importance of the principle that territorial expansion by armed force cannot be condoned, including the "Jordanian portions of Jerusalem."⁶¹ Nothing in this statement suggests the idea of Palestinian rights to self-determination or the possibility of a Palestinian state. Up until this point the American

church leadership saw Palestinians as refugees.

On the evening of July 10th John Coventry Smith, Ralph Chandler, and several other church leaders met at the UN Delegates Lounge with ten Christian and Muslim delegates from Arab states. The delegates spoke of the new wave of refugees, and of United States policy which "at the United Nations, the U.S. delegation was known as being in full support of the Israel position." At the end of Smith's memorandum recording this conversation, he wondered if the "emphasis upon the changed policy of the United States may not be important for our attention. . . . I think we probably do not have a foreign policy about the Middle East . . . But I wonder if in the absence of a foreign policy . . . we are not about to slip into the vacuum with a policy that really comes down hard on support of Israel as a bulwark against Communism in the Middle East."⁶²

Two days later Smith wrote another memorandum addressed to close colleagues in which he reflected on next steps for the National Council's Ad Hoc Committee on the Middle East and particularly for the United Presbyterian Church:

"It seems to me that we must furnish material for our own understanding of, and for the education of, our American Christian constituency concerning the question of Zionism and the State of Israel. . . . If I sense what our people in the churches are saying to us in this crisis in the Middle East, they are concerned . . . that they have information, background, understanding so that they might be able to judge what they read in their newspapers and in the magazines. . . . It seems to me that in our personal relationships with the Jewish community, and in our relationships with Arabs, our understanding . . . may lead us to a better understanding of what they are saying to us and of what our reply ought to be."⁶³

In these two memoranda the chief administrative office for the Presbyterian Church in its program of overseas mission and relations, appeared to be reflecting a growing concern about the influence of Zionism on United States policy and the

Presbyterian laity. The war had obviously raised serious questions about Israel's intentions for the future of the Palestinians and how their loss could be resolved with justice to all parties. With most Americans he had seemed to accept Arab intransigence as the block to peace efforts. Now with Israel's strengthened position, militarily and politically in the United States, he was concerned about the intention of Zionism: would a militarily powerful Israel with strong U.S. political backing be prepared to make peace with its defeated Arab neighbors?

In August the American Jewish Committee (AJC) published a paper entitled: *Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis*, by Judith Hershkopf Banki, a member of the staff of the Interreligious Affairs Department. In this twenty-page paper, the author quotes relevant portions of statements by various Christian leaders noting that before the war many expressed concern for Israel although "statements from Christian institutional bodies were noticeably rare." Following the war the atmosphere changed. Presbyterian Henry P. van Dusen, past president of Union Theological Seminary wrote a letter to the *New York Times* (June 26), Christian leaders, he said had "silenced their judgment on Israel's assault on her Arab neighbors . . . partly lest they be misinterpreted as pro-Arab, which they most certainly were not, but primarily through profound disquiet over Israel's actions and ambitions . . ." H. Park Johnson, of COEMAR, called for an understanding of the "deep passions on both sides" and warned that Christians should not identify too closely with Zionist groups if they were concerned about an Arab-Israeli reconciliation." Many statements quoted centered on the future of Jerusalem, most expressing concern over Israel's unilateral annexation of Arab Jerusalem.

The Banki paper goes on to suggest both a changed Jewish and Christian perspective on this Middle East struggle. On the Jewish side there seemed to be a

demand for all out Christian support for Israel. But "Christian groups were hesitating to make official commitments concerning issues that Jews—and indeed most Americans, according to a Gallup poll—considered basic in the Middle East crisis. Their silence . . . aroused the resentment of many Jewish spokesmen." Rabbi Marc Tannenbaum, National Director of Interreligious Affairs AJC, is quoted as criticizing "the failure of the diplomatic institutions of Christendom to speak an unequivocal word in defense of the preservation of the Jewish people." Dialogue in the past, he said, had been confined to problems of the diaspora, but "no future Jewish-Christian dialogue will take place without Jews insisting upon the confrontation on the part of Christians of the profound historical, religious, cultural, and liturgical meaning of the land of Israel and of Jerusalem to the Jewish people." The *Christian Century* is quoted as responding editorially to Tannenbaum on July 12: "If interfaith dialogue must cease until all Christians become Zionists, then, of course, there will be no dialogue. . . . This is the time to increase and deepen the Jewish-Christian dialogue, not to suspend it."

While Banki was writing this analysis of Christian reaction to the June War, Chandler went to the Middle East for the first time. During a recent interview he stated: "Field experience changes people. I changed."⁶⁴ On his return he prepared a paper to share with colleagues. In it he stated that he had visited Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. He talked with church leaders, twenty-seven government officials, journalists, professors, military men, UNRWA administrators, United States embassy people, people in a dozen refugee camps and uncounted people in private homes. But the paper contains very little on the subject of what he learned because of his Middle East visit.⁶⁵ When asked about that point he said: "I wrote that paper very carefully: I was in a difficult position between Church and So-

ciety and COEMAR; my director at C&S objected to my spending so much time with COEMAR because C&S worked closely with the Jewish community on many issues. I did, too."⁶⁶

His report concentrates on his work with the Middle East Task Force of the NCCCUSA which was chaired by the General Secretary of COEMAR, John Smith. He mentions that as he worked on the issue (before his visit to the Middle East), he was "impressed with the ability of Zionist organizations in America to influence news coverage. Even if one is pro-Israeli . . . Americans (are) committed to fair play. At one stage of the controversy, I did not think the Arabs were getting it. As an old aphorism has it: 'He who knows only his side of the argument does not even know that.'"⁶⁷ His work with COEMAR and the NCCCUSA had prepared him to understand what he was to learn in the Middle East.

Chandler said that one of the primary things which changed his perspective was the oppressive Israeli attitudes toward Palestinians. He also learned the Palestinian view of history for the first time. The issue of justice for them became significant for him. Few of his colleagues in C&S understood these issues. He came back with a determination to organize other International Affairs secretaries with whom he worked in the NCCCUSA in order to talk with representatives of the Israeli government and New York Jewish religious leaders—to try to encourage them to be generous to the Palestinian people. He got little help from colleagues and of his own efforts to talk with Israelis and American Jews, he said: "I got cut to ribbons."⁶⁸

At the September meeting of the Advisory Committee on International Affairs following Chandler's return from the Middle East, that issue came up for discussion. Despite initial efforts to downplay it, finally agreement was reached that something be prepared along the lines of Chandler's presentation. But nothing went to General Assembly. Then at the 1968 As-

sembly, COEMAR reported:

The Commission realizes the importance of clear understanding by the people of the United States of the real issues involved in the Middle East crisis, and, in collaboration with the agencies of other denominations related to the Christian community in the Middle East, has sought to disseminate through the churches and through mass media channels factual information concerning the crisis and its underlying causes. This information has been gleaned both from research and from on-the-spot reports of qualified individual reporters.⁶⁹

In January 1968, C&S elected a new Director, the Rev. Dean H. Lewis. He came into office with what he calls "an instinctive American sympathy for Israel." He didn't know much about the Middle East and didn't want to get into it. He was aware that COEMAR was pushing for action and equally aware that his predecessors were in tension with COEMAR on the issue of tackling the Middle East issue.⁷⁰ One staff minute of January 1969 reflects this view

Mr. Lewis reported that he had had a call from COEMAR indicating their concern about the . . . study of the Middle East . . . he feels sure there will be an effort at the Assembly to draft a statement . . . if one is not presented by Church and Society. He feels . . . it would be wise to have present at the Assembly a credible Middle East expert who is neutral or impartial to the church mission establishment.

The delay in tackling the Middle East problem from at least September 1967 until June 1971 suggests something of the countervailing forces at work within the Church. Chandler reports that for his period in office there was something of a "Mexican standoff" between the BCE and COEMAR over the issue—especially between the two General Secretaries of those Boards. He remembers that there were pressures from the Jewish community to keep the Church from going public with an official policy, pointing out that Jewish cooperation on national issues could be jeopardized should the Church express a view such as that held by "the missionaries." He added that the Church

had a number of "politically naive people around in those days" who didn't understand the Jewish pressure groups nor the justice issue because they lacked Middle East field experience.⁷¹

Finally, in the June 1971 meeting of Church and Society, after yet another effort to delay matters, Lewis, pointing out that the General Assembly had requested a study and report by 1972, forced the appointment of a Task Force on the Middle East. A review Group was to develop plans for the study at that particular meeting.⁷² The Review Group agreed on the appointment of a Task Force to prepare a background paper and policy statement, including recommendations, for the 1972 General Assembly. There was considerable discussion about the make-up of the Middle East Task Force (METF). It had been suggested that an American Jew be part of the Task Force; in discussion some wanted a Palestinian included. It was finally agreed that "neither an American Jew nor an Arab be asked to serve on the Task Force, per se, but that such persons, including a Palestinian, be used as consultants . . ." The final composition of the Task Force was to be: two Council members, one or two pastors, one or two theologians, an ecumenical relations specialist, an International Relations specialist, a pro-Israeli Christian, and a missionary from the Middle East.⁷³

On November 18, the chairman of the METF, the Rev. Dr. Elwyn A. Smith, reported to the Council on C&S. Following his report, he responded to a question regarding the proposed thrust of the Task Force work by saying;

The Presbyterian Church has these multiple relations. It (has) relations with Washington, it (has) relations to the American Jewish community, it (has) its commitment to its own personnel, fraternal workers and the Near Eastern Christians, it (has) its great problem of conscience, about the murder of Jews and the present danger to Jews in Israel. And where do we stand on that? A point which we are pressed both by our Jewish friends and our consciences to try to come up with something that will at least give us the basis for dealing with

that multiple of great conflicting range of questions.⁷⁴

The absence of any reference to the Palestinians as a factor in the proposed report suggest something about the chairman's position. Smith has indicated that he came to the work of the Task Force "more sensitive to Israel's need for defense and that the report first produced reflected his feelings."⁷⁵

At that same meeting a member of the Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations who had just returned from a visit to the Middle East, registered on behalf of the Fraternal Workers with whom he had met, a serious objection to the manner in which the Task Force had been constituted and the hurried schedule on which it planned to report to General Assembly. The Council agreed that its schedule for reporting could be delayed if necessary.⁷⁶

Following that meeting Smith and one staff aid made a seventeen day visit to the Middle East during which time extensive interviews were conducted with over ninety individuals in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. After four two-day meetings, members of the Task Force contributed to the writing of the report, which the chairman edited for style and continuity.⁷⁷

At the 1972 General Assembly, the Standing Committee reviewed the report and acknowledged that it was "a scholarly beginning to a study of the 'Peoples and Conflict in the Middle East.'" There was objection to the report on the part of some commissioners and a representative of the Fraternal Workers registered serious objection. Floor debate included two motions not to receive the report for study; These did not carry, but received significant support. In finally approving the report the Assembly recommended that relevant United Nations resolutions be included in the study document, statements by the World Council of Churches, and that more than two members of the

Task Force visit the Middle East for a period of at least four weeks in preparing the final report. Finally it was requested that among the helps for study be theological perspectives differing from those in the report and that additional personnel in the field of "Islamic, Judaic, and Eastern Christianity" be added to the Task Force."⁷⁸

At the heart of the theological section of this report is a section relating to the land. Speaking of the covenant with Abraham it states: "The particularity of this covenant is striking: it is a promise of a land and a people. . . . It is often overlooked that the Abrahamic covenant is unconditional in that it is not based on the prior acts of the people nor can it be invalidated by any sin of the people. . . . In this perspective, the current conjunction of Land and People in the state of Israel may be viewed as a sign of the continuing relationship of God with the Jewish people."⁷⁹ The church in stressing the alienation of the Jewish people from God "has insisted that the covenant between God and the Jews was broken," the report says, and this leads to "the discontinuity of Christianity with its Jewish origins (and) is antisemitism. . . . The emergence of Israel confronts the church with the occasion to repent its age-long antisemitism."⁸⁰

In the published report, Wanis A. Simaan, a Fraternal Visitor to the Assembly from Lebanon provided "a differing perspective." He cited Emil Brunner, "God is free to reject Israel because of its unbelief without becoming unfaithful to His promise . . ." Simaan goes on to comment: "Implicit in Brunner's idea is the continuation of 'the spiritual Israel' in the church. This understanding does not speak of a 'new people' replacing an 'old people.' It is the same people, the one people, who exhibit the faith of Abraham both in ancient Israel as well as the Church of Jesus Christ; these are the heirs of the promise of God to Abraham (Matt. 3:7-9)."⁸¹

The report conclusions were four

1. . . . (the task force) recognizes that the con-

duct of negotiations, especially between foreign states, is a technical matter on which bodies concerned about general directions toward peace cannot usefully recommend.

2. It does not wish to be understood as preaching moral obligations to the nations concerned with Middle Eastern issues, in the light of centuries of antisemitism and particularly of Western treatment of the Jewish people in this century, and in the light of the long history of Crusades and colonial subjugation of the Arab peoples.

3. It does not wish to be understood to be speaking for the Christians of the Middle East, however important it considers its own fellowship with them to be, since each such body is situated in circumstances widely different from those of any American church body and must speak for itself.

4. It does not wish to suggest that any summary treatment of the complex life and political clashes of the Middle Eastern peoples can suffice . . ."⁸²

The 1972 report may have been well received by Presbyterian staff members who had resisted tackling the Middle East problem and it was very well received by the Jewish community. But it received a very negative response from the Fraternal Worker community in the Middle East. There seemed to be a division within the staff of COEMAR. Because of its two divisions there tended to be two perspectives on this preliminary report. The Associate General Secretary for Ecumenical Relations, who served on the METF, says there was "a standoff between relations with the Jewish community and the Middle East Fraternal Workers." He added that "this standoff continued throughout COEMAR's life."⁸³

IV

An increasing number of COEMAR's Executive Staff were becoming aware of the issue of justice at stake in the Middle East. Because of the nature of their work, a significant number were involved in activities of the World Council of Churches. The first General Secretary of the WCC, Willem A. Visser t'Hooft, maintained an even-handed approach to the Middle East conflict. He had now retired. During his

tenure the European Director of the CCIA had been Elfan Rees from England. Like most westerners working on International Affairs for the churches, his sympathies were with Israel. In 1966 Eugene Carson Blake, former Stated Clerk of the UPC and General Secretary of the NCCUSA, became General Secretary of the WCC. Following the retirement of Rees, the new director of CCIA was Leopoldo J. Niiulus from Argentina. His appointment was only one of many from the third world to important posts in the WCC. In addition, third world church leaders became significantly involved on WCC commissions. Included were leaders of the Orthodox Churches of the Middle East. Most of these third world staff and commission members saw the Middle East conflict far differently than those in the West who carried the weight of continuing guilt for the Holocaust. And as these changes occurred in Geneva, they began to have an impact on member churches' staffs in Europe and America.

It is important to understand the Middle East Fraternal Workers perspective. In an "Open Letter to Christians of the West" dated Spring 1968, they had indicated that they viewed western Christians as uninformed about fellow Christians in the Middle East, and largely influenced by Zionist views, they urged their western Christian colleagues to "be sensitive and responsive to the present Middle Eastern tragedy," looking "beyond the one-sided reporting and opinions current in the West."

From the beginning of the appointment of the Middle East Task Force of Church and Society, they sought more input and urged the task force to take more time to become aware of the issues at stake in the Middle East. They had a deep conviction that Presbyterian concern for relations with the American Jewish community would prevail over issues of justice for the Palestinian people. They believed that the COEMAR staff with whom they worked most directly, were interested more in implementing policies developed at home than in the issues of justice and peace as

the fraternal workers saw them in their day-to-day work.⁸⁴ During the visit of the first team from the METF to the Middle East, the Chairman of the Task Force had told some Fraternal Workers ". . . that if they carried their case as they have, there would no doubt be a considerable amount of communication concerning the problems of the Middle East in Jewish and Christian congregations in the United States . . ." ⁸⁵ They considered this a threat.

Removed geographically from churches and friends at home, the Fraternal Workers felt deeply that all they had given their lives to do, and their strongly held concerns for the Palestinian people, were about to be betrayed by the very church they loved and served. They prepared analyses of the Preliminary Study, sending copies to COEMAR related staff and to friends in the church. In a memorandum written by Dean Lewis to William P. Thompson, then Stated Clerk of the UPC, dated May 8, 1972, Lewis reported that several hundred letters have been written to Presbyterians regarding the study and that funds were being raised in the Fraternal Worker community to send representatives to General Assembly. On the same date Lewis wrote to Donald Black, Associate General Secretary for Ecumenical Mission of COEMAR saying "This thing is getting out of hand." In a C&S Council meeting following the General Assembly, Dean Lewis commented "that the Church's fraternal workers in Arab countries are more upset than Arabs . . ." ⁸⁶ These Fraternal Workers were not endearing themselves to the members of the Task Force but they were making sure that their voice was heard even from a distance.

Before the writing of the final report Lewis recognized the possibility of a future clash at General Assembly with people who would be considered by the Assembly as most knowledgeable about the Middle East. He decided to prepare himself by making his first visit to the region to see things for himself. In Beirut he had wide-ranging conversations with Fraternal Workers and Palestinians, and in Israel

with Jews of all persuasions. He remembers that it was Israeli Jews in the peace movement who impressed him most. From them he learned of the dissent within the Israeli community over treatment of Palestinians under Israel's rule. What Palestinians had said in Beirut and East Jerusalem about the oppressive nature of Israeli military rule in the occupied territories was authenticated by Jews who saw the need for peace and an end to the occupation. This trip was a turning point in Lewis's understanding of the Middle East issue and was to have a major impact on the final report.⁸⁷

Following that trip the Task Force had a series of conversations with Palestinians, Israelis, Arabs and American Jews of all shades of opinion. In addition they brought in State Department people with Middle East expertise. As they reached out to more and more consultants with knowledgeable understanding of the conflict, views began to change. Finally, the second official trip mandated by the 1972 Assembly occurred in October 1973. The team found themselves caught in Cairo at the outbreak of that year's war. As a result they had the opportunity to obtain in-depth exposure to the spirit of the Egyptian people. They began to understand something of the Egyptian desire for peace despite their involvement in the current war and learned of the pre-war attempts to involve Israel in negotiations for a settlement, efforts which were rebuffed by Israeli leadership. On return to the United States, Lewis discussed his experience with the American Jewish leadership with whom he had been working. They told him he was naive. And as conversations continued, Lewis became more and more aware that the organized American Jewish leadership seemed unwilling to consider opportunities and options which might lead to peace.⁸⁸

V

As the time approached for the writing of the final report to go to General Assem-

bly, the work done by the Task Force had brought about a change of perspective. The desire for close relationships with the American Jewish community remained; but in addition there was an understanding of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The issue of justice for a people who had lost homes and land for a cause over which they had no responsibility (the Holocaust), became a dominant issue. The seeming lack of deep commitment to seeking peace on the part of the Israeli government and friends in the American Jewish community was troubling.

Thus, it was inevitable that the report approved by the 1974 General Assembly was quite different from the one accepted for study in 1972. Referring to the Confession of 1967 and its emphasis on reconciliation, one part of the report points out: "To ignore injustices that have been commonplace is not reconciliation. A people 'reconciled' to its own suffering and humiliation is not truly reconciled."⁸⁹ Calling for increased dialogue about the situation both at home and in the Middle East, the report emphasizes the need for a major reassessment of "our mission objectives and strategy in the Middle East." It goes on to say: "The long involvement of the United Presbyterian Church in mission in the Middle East . . . makes us something more than third parties though something less than full participants in its life . . ."⁹⁰

The report states its conviction "that the negotiation of concrete terms for the settlement of Middle East conflict is the responsibility of the Middle Eastern parties themselves, with appropriate support and assistance from the international community." It goes on to say "that if preliminary steps toward peace and justice are to be successful in the Middle East, the following criteria should apply in the evaluation of any proposed settlement:"

THE PALESTINIANS. The right and power of Palestinian people to self-determination by po-

litical expression, based upon full civil liberties for all . . . If the Palestinians choose to organize a permanent political structure, then provisions should be made to determine its jurisdiction, assure its security, and support its development. In any case, provision should be made for just compensation or restoration of Palestinian property and land, and the satisfactory settlement of all Palestinian refugees, including return where feasible and desired. The Palestinian people should be full participants in negotiations concerning any of these matters through representatives of their own choosing.⁹¹

In this statement Presbyterians for the first time formally recognized the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. The time of seeing all Palestinians as objects of relief work was over; the issue of justice had surfaced and justice required self-determination. Additional criteria included:

JEWISH PEOPLE AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL. In this section the same rights were claimed for the Jewish people in Israel with the added proviso that "Provisions should be made to assure Israel's security and to support its development." Then this important sentence was added: "Christians must repudiate in unambiguous terms all forms of anti-semitism and must explore ways by which the church might respond to the continuing human needs of the Jewish people both in Israel and in other lands."

BOUNDARIES AND MUTUAL SECURITY. Boundaries of all states in the area should be mutually defined and accepted. In this process Arab states should recognize Israel as a sovereign state, equal in political and legal status to any state in the Middle East, and Israel should assure neighboring Arab states that it renounces any extension of its mutually defined and accepted boundaries. Effective means should be established to guarantee these assurances until a true community of peoples in the Middle East makes such measure unnecessary.

POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS. This criteria urges Israel to assure full civil rights to its Palestinian minority and the Arab world to do the same giving special consideration to Jews in Arab lands so that they may be free to emigrate. It adds,

"Arab countries should also deal justly with Jewish claims for compensation and restoration resulting from the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries."⁹²

JERUSALEM. The parties involved should negotiate a shared common authority for a unified Jerusalem that will preserve the integrity of the city; give full expression to the legitimate national political interests of both Israel and the Palestinians; protect the rights of all residents; and protect the legitimate religious interests of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim groups, giving free access to all holy places.⁹³

In reflecting on the way in which the report adopted differed from the report approved for study, Lewis gives credit to COEMAR and its successor agency following the 1971 restructuring, The Program Agency. But he especially mentioned the tenacity of the Fraternal Workers who throughout the study provided background and informational studies. At one point, as indicated, they were considered a biased, interfering pressure group. By the time the Task Force had done its homework, they became more appreciated for the contribution they were making. Institutionally speaking, Lewis is probably right. But there were other factors. Lewis, himself, following his first trip to the Middle East made a significant contribution to changing the direction of the study. Several new members of the Task Force, who joined after the 1972 report was produced, also made a difference. Concerned members of local congregations, people in many differing capacities, also made their voices heard. Almost all of them had one thing in common. They traveled to the Middle East on tourism or business and had taken the opportunity to break away from the "tour-bus" mentality to see for themselves, and talk with, local people, especially Palestinian Christians. They soon became aware that the common American acceptance of Israel as defined by the American media left much to be desired. They heard the story of the Palestinian people's loss of homes and livelihood and had trouble relating that to

the image of what the media was saying at home. Some came home looking for answers; others found answers, as Lewis did, in talking with those in the Jewish community in Israel who work for peace in a society that gives them little acceptance.

In 1979 the Interreligious Affairs Department of the American Jewish Committee, published a Background Report by Judith Hershcopf Banki entitled "Anti-Israel Influence in American Churches." Banki defined "anti-Israel sentiment" as "the use of double standards—harsher judgments and stricter demands made on Israel than on her Arab antagonists." An illustration of this bias, she stated, is "calling upon Israel to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), still publicly committed to her destruction, without the contingent demand that the PLO recognize Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state."

Banki then goes on to spend more than two pages arguing that one of the anti-Israel influences is "The Arab Missionary and Relief Establishments." Out of these activities, she argues, has "emerged a group of church professionals who naturally sympathize with Arab aspirations, identify with Arab views, and are ready to promote Arab interests both within their organizations and in public—often at the expense of Israel. Men and women like these usually hold the staff positions in the Middle East departments . . . and are thus chiefly responsible . . . for drafting resolutions on the Middle East." "In contrast" she says, "staff members sympathetic to Israel rarely serve in Middle East departments. They do serve in other departments, and try to alter or balance resolutions harmful to Israel at church conventions, but their efforts are almost invariably last-ditch struggles . . ." Banki then goes on to name the United Presbyterian Church among others as having the most "active anti-Israel staff members."

Unfortunately, this Background Report fails to point to any specific statement or quotation applicable to the Presbyterian

Church. At the time the 1974 statement was adopted the Liaison for the Middle East of our church was a Korean-American with no missionary or relief work experience in the Middle East. His predecessor, while an American, also had no previous connection to the Middle East and the same was true for his successor. The General Secretary of COEMAR had been a missionary in Japan but had no Middle East experience. The General Director of the Program Agency (at the time the 1974 statement was adopted) had been mostly active in the Civil Rights Movement and had no overseas missionary experience. Dean Lewis, as noted, had no Middle East experience when the study began. As far as the Presbyterian Church was concerned, Banki was following the wrong trail.

The issue was better stated at the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. (at the time a sister church) in June 1975, in a paper entitled "Christian Witness and Moral Discourse Regarding the Middle East Conflict." The PCUS had no historic missionary ties to the Middle East and none of Banki's reasons for "anti-Israel sentiment" apply. The following excerpts give the flavor of this carefully-written document:

. . . the Church must reaffirm without hesitancy its identification with the Jewish people . . . as Christians, we must not let our historic identification with the Jewish people blind us to the reality of our ties to Arab peoples as well. Not only are many Arabs themselves Christians, but the followers of Islam also revere the Old Testament prophets, share with us and with Jewish people a love and care for the Holy City, Jerusalem, and claim Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as fathers in the faith. . . . The increasing recognition by Christians of the very real and just claims of the Palestinian people that the government of Israel has too long neglected, should not be taken as insensitivity to the needs of the Jews. . . . it is healthy that a major focus of the effort to achieve international justice in the Middle East be focused on the rights of Palestinians rather than on Arabs in general. . . . we feel that sooner or later Israel must negotiate with the Palestinians and the sooner this happens, the sooner there will be over-

come a major hurdle to justice and peace. . . . We believe the United States has a commitment to help Israel as a nation to survive, but that this is not and must not be a commitment to support Israel in the defense of its present boundaries, or in the pursuit of political settlements that do not take seriously the claims of the Palestinians.⁹⁴

In her charge against "The Arab Missionary and Relief Establishments," Banki missed the reality of the Palestinians. From its early days, Israel has been trying to prove the truth of the early Zionist byword: "A land without a people for a people without a land." David Ben-Gurion put it another way: ". . . the Palestinians are not a nation."⁹⁵ And Golda Meir said: "It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."⁹⁶ However in their efforts to survive, Palestinian refugees have become a nationhood. Unlike the other Arabs, they were not given an opportunity to express self-determination. Driven out of their homes by war and threats, they survived in squalid refugee camps, unwanted by their Arab neighbors and Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization molded their nationalism. The United Presbyterian Church recognized them in its 1974 statement. That same year the United Nations received Yasir Arafat. And though it took until 1988 before the United States began to officially talk with the PLO, it has happened and today Israel alone refuses to speak with the chosen representative of the Palestinian nation.

And because of a long-standing American bias against the Palestinian people which is only now beginning to change, it has been very hard to obtain a fair understanding of their hopes and aspirations while living in the U.S. Those who travel to the Middle East and seek to gain understanding, do so. Missionaries from that area, of course, have had a special opportunity to get the facts. But they have no monopoly on the sources. And when those in our church, especially those in

COEMAR, pushed for the matter to be studied and reported, that result was inevitable.

From 1974 until the present the Middle East policy of the Presbyterian Church has held to the central theme of the 1974 report. The issue seems to arise in most every Assembly, most notably around developments in the region. In 1982 the Assembly was held while Israeli military forces were besieging Beirut and the horrors of the aerial bombardment of that city were on every telecast. The resolution which went to the floor of the Assembly was augmented to include reference to actively seeking "the establishment of a national sovereign state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an expression of self-determination of the Palestinian people." It also urged the Program Agency to be "actively in contact with and supportive of peace movements in Israel . . ."⁹⁷

In 1984, following reunion with the PCUS, and an election year, the Assembly adopted a comprehensive statement picking up the elements of Middle East policy of both former streams of the Church. Special emphasis was laid upon our government continuing "nonrecognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, pending international negotiations to determine Jerusalem's future;" and on Israel's ending its building of settlements on occupied Palestinian land. The most important factor, however, in this year was the Assembly's call for a special emphasis "for study and advocacy for the two year period of 1985 and 1986, calling on all governing bodies, particularly the presbyteries to stress this emphasis" either through existing Peacemaking Task Forces or special Middle East Task Forces.⁹⁸

In 1988 the Assembly, in light of the *Intifada*, or Palestinian Uprising against the occupation, called upon Israel to "Cease the systematic violation of human rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories" specifically "practices of administrative detention, collective punishment, the torture of prisoners and suspects, and

the deportation of dissidents." It also called upon the United States government to insist that weapons supplied for Israel's defense not "be used against civilian populations in the occupied territories or in aggressive attacks or disproportionate retaliation upon other countries" and that "further military and security assistance to Israel be contingent upon the honoring of these principles and upon the cessation of repression against Palestinians . . ." In addition it called for an end to aid "which subsidizes new Israeli settlements in the occupied territories . . ." Being an election year in which some were seeking the expulsion of the PLO Mission to the United Nations, the Assembly called upon our government to continue to permit the operation of the mission "in conformity with international law and treaty obligations."⁹⁹

In 1989 the General Assembly took cognizance of the Palestine National Council's declaration of an independent State of Palestine "to live in peace alongside the State of Israel" and of the continuing Intifada "and Israel's reaction to it, characterized by much military and Israeli settler brutality" and taking note of Israeli popular demonstrations against the occupation: The resolution encouraged Presbyterians "To engage in dialogue with Jews in both Israel and the United States, and with Palestinians and other Arabs in the Middle East and the United States to encourage Palestinian and Israeli states living side by side in mutual respect; and to support the efforts of the Middle East Council of Churches in laboring for a peaceful solution of reconciliation; and to participate in mission study tours to the Middle East." Finally, in relation to Israel particularly, it urged that it be made clear to Israel "that the United States' efforts for a negotiated settlement in no way diminish its support for Israel's security."¹⁰⁰

VI

In reviewing our Presbyterian history in the Middle East one is impressed that is

has been a concern for the *people* of the region. From the earliest days of Presbyterian involvement in mission, our identification has not been with governments, colonialist or nationalist, but with people. Originally this concern was expressed in education and health ministries for all of whatever ethnic background or religion.

Following World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust, it was only natural that those of our denominational staff and leaders whose efforts were directed toward national issues would find their ties to be with Jewish colleagues working for Civil Rights in the South and concerns such as Vietnam and issues of Church and State nationwide. Their knowledge of the Israel-Palestine conflict was informed only by the American media and their contact with the Jewish community. On the other hand, those who worked in the Middle East or traveled there with desire to obtain understanding of the tensions of the region were exposed to a very different reality. The fact that the two worlds in which our Church was at work should have caused so little tension within the life of the Church is testimony to the wisdom of COEMAR's leadership in keeping the frustrations of Middle East Fraternal Workers from boiling over.

The strength of our Church's Reformed Tradition must also be credited with the healthy convergence of the two streams of concern which tended to divide us in most of the decades of the fifties and sixties: concern for the still unhealed wound in the heart of the Jewish people over the Holocaust as understood by those who worked most closely with Jewish colleagues; and concern for the injustices to the Palestinian people who have been asked to pay the price of rehabilitation resulting from Hitler's insane obsession to destroy the Jewish people. Until recently neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian people understood the position taken by our Church as a basis for peacemaking. Today the Palestinians have recognized the legitimacy of the State of Israel and are pre-

pared to make peace with their enemy. All Presbyterians pray for the day when Israel will say with the prophet: "Neither by force of arms nor by brute strength, but by my spirit! says the Lord of Hosts"¹⁰¹ For in that spirit alone peace can come to the Middle East.

NOTES

¹ Hertzell Fishman makes this point in his *American Protestantism and a Jewish State* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973): "Because the (American Protestant) missionaries in the Arab countries provided political support for the Arab cause, they inevitably became opponents of Jewish nationalism in Palestine. Consequently, the sponsoring denominations in the United States . . . invariably supported the battle against Zionism." p. 179.

² Fishman, *ibid.*, 61, implies that Protestant churches reflected "continued sympathy for the victims of Nazism and condemned anti-Semitism" but that sympathy "seemed to connote a religious term void of substantive meaning when applied to Jews."

³ This document is part of the collected Presbyterian Church related materials in the Library and Archives of the Presbyterian Church (USA), Department of History (DOH) in Philadelphia. All of the Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA) and predecessor bodies used in this paper can be found at the DOH. All other minutes and correspondence referred to are also in the DOH collection.

⁴ *Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA* (1946) pp. 198-ff.

⁵ Peter Grose, *Israel in the Mind of America* (New York, Knopf, 1983) p. 36.

⁶ *Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA* (1916) pp. 185 f.

⁷ Grose, p. 67.

⁸ See Regina Sharif, *Non-Jewish Zionism* (London, Zed Press, 1983) pp. 94 f. Lansing's memorandum to Wilson (December 13, 1917) giving his reasons for not putting the United States on record as supporting the Balfour Declaration (although Wilson had already indicated his approval to the British) gave three points the third of which was: ". . . many Christian sects and individuals would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to the absolute control of the race credited with the death of Christ."

⁹ Freudenberg, *La Persecution des Juifs en Allemagne*, cited in Johan M. Snoek, *The Grey Book* (Assen, van Gorcum, 1969), p. 83.

¹⁰ Snoek, p. 84.

¹¹ Federal Council Bulletin (October 1938), p. 13.

¹² Original telegram addressed to Rev. Samuel Cavert, Federal Council of Churches, in rare documents collection, DOH.

¹³ Cavert, "Memorandum on White House Conference on Refugees" FCCCA Archives, DOH

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Fishman, p. 57, omits reference to the President's Advisory Committee and implies through his

section title—"Against Immigration to the United States"—that the FCCCA was unconcerned for refugees and did not work for changes in immigration quotas; both implications are untrue.

¹⁶ Federal Council Bulletin (October 1939), p. 8. Fishman argued that Christian Leadership opposed Jewish nationalism and a homeland in Palestine and for support leaned heavily on the *Christian Century* as a publication which spoke for Protestant leadership. This paper has used FCCCA Archives as source material, not the *Century* and finds that insofar as Fishman indicts the FCCCA or Protestant leadership for lack of humanitarian concern for European refugees he appears to be ill-informed.

¹⁷ Federal Council Bulletin (February 1940), p. 7.

¹⁸ New York Times (Jan. 10, 1939) cited in Snoek, 88. Senator Robert F. Wagner introduced a resolution to implement this concern. The FCCCA supported the bill. Wagner later withdrew the resolution when in Committee the children's visas were made to apply against the German quota rather than increasing it as was intended.

¹⁹ Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA (1939), p. 167.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.* Report of the BNM (1940), p. 37.

²² Dr. Rieger's letter to Dr. Visser 't'Hoof (April 14, 1965) Archives of the WCC, Geneva. Cited in Snoek, 261. Rieger was reporting on his earliest knowledge of the Nazi plan of Jewish extermination.

²³ Federal Council Bulletin (January 1943), p. 12.

²⁴ *Ibid.* (February 1943).

²⁵ *Ibid.* (April 1943), p. 15.

²⁶ Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA (1943), pp. 258-f.

²⁷ Minutes of the General Assembly UPNA (1943), p. 1025.

²⁸ Nathan C. Belth, *A Promise to Keep, A Narrative of the American Encounter with Anti-Semitism* (New York, Times Books, 1979), pp. 155-f.

²⁹ Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA (1940), p. 181.

³⁰ Belth, p. 156.

³¹ Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA (1948), p. 204.

³² Timothy P. Weber, *Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming, American Premillennialism, 1875-1982* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) makes an excellent case for biblical literalism and premillennialism (particularly its dispensational form) as being the chief reason for American Protestant support of Israel. His thesis applies to some Presbyterian especially among the laity. In addition, some Presbyterian leadership has been influenced by what could be called the Reinhold Niebuhr pro-Zionism which is not premillennial, being more influenced by the Holocaust and a search for Jewish-Christian theological understanding.

³³ Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA (1949) Report of the Board of Foreign Missions, p. 169.

³⁴ J. Richard Butler, telephone interview (April 7, 1990).

³⁵ Millar Burrows, Winkley Professor of Biblical Theology, Yale Divinity School, wrote to Samuel Cavert on February 6, 1949: "I've been wanting to get in touch with you concerning the Arab refugee problem . . . about which Christian organizations are maintaining an appalling silence . . . The indifference

of American Christians . . . can be explained only by their ignorance, but for that I cannot but hold our church leaders in part responsible."

³⁶ Press release May 25, 1951 signed by American delegates.

³⁷ Walter W. Van Kirk, Executive Director, Department of International Justice and Goodwill, NCCCUA.

³⁸ The Problem of Arab Refugees from Palestine, Report of a Conference held in Beirut, Lebanon (May 21-25, 1956), p. 22. Rees' Middle East experience had been in pre-1948 Palestine where he helped settle Jewish refugees.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁰ Minutes of the General Assembly PCUSA (1954), p. 188.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* (1948) Report of the BFM, p. 68.

⁴² *Ibid.* (1949) Report of the BFM, p. 48.

⁴³ *Ibid.* (1950) Report of the BFM, p. 60.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* (1956), p. 178.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* (1957) Report of the BFM, p. 60.

⁴⁶ Document "Previous Decisions of the General Board Constituting the Committee of the Beirut Conference Findings," Archives NCCCUA, DOH.

⁴⁷ Interim Report to the Committee on the Beirut Conference Findings.

⁴⁸ Letter Herman F. Reissig to Clifford Earle (March 11, 1957).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Dean H. Lewis (April 7, 1990), Margaret E. Kuhn (April 19, 1990) Telephone interviews.

⁵¹ Charles T. Leber, Jr., Archives NCCCUA, DOH.

⁵² *Ibid.* Telephone interview (April 16, 1990).

⁵³ Archives Church & Society, DOH.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Donald Black to John C. Smith, Memorandum (June 6, 1967).

⁵⁶ Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York, Random House, 1977), p. 344.

⁵⁷ In an interview with the Hebrew newspaper Ma'ariv (April 4, 1972) Chief-of-staff Haim Bar-Lev stated: "We are not threatened with genocide on the eve of the six-day war, and we had never thought of such possibility." In the same article, General Ezer Weizman, Chief of Operations, said: "There was never a danger of extermination. . . . This hypothesis had never been considered in any serious meeting." Later when Weizman was urged not to speak so frankly in view of diaspora Jewish feelings, he said: "The Jews of the Diaspora would like, for reasons of their own, to see us as heroes, our backs to the wall. This desire of theirs, however, will not affect the reality of the situation." (*Le Monde*, June 3, 1972).

⁵⁸ Ralph Clark Chandler, paper, Reflections on the Middle East (September 20, 1967).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Telephone interview (March 31, 1990).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* paper, A Draft Position Paper on the Palestine Arab Refugee Problem (June 22, 1967).

⁶¹ Resolution on the Crisis in the Middle East, adopted by the Executive Committee NCCCUA (July 7, 1967).

⁶² John Coventry Smith to R.H.E. Espy, et al., Memorandum (July 11, 1967).

⁶³ *Ibid.* to Robert Bilheimer, et al., memorandum (July 14, 1967).

⁶⁴ Chandler, interview.

⁶⁵ Chandler, Reflections.

⁶⁶ Chandler, interview.

⁶⁷ Chandler, Reflections.

⁶⁸ Chandler, interview.

⁶⁹ Minutes of the General Assembly UPC (1968) COEMAR Report, pp. 404-f.

⁷⁰ Lewis, interview.

⁷¹ Chandler, interview.

⁷² Minutes, Council C&S (June 11-13, 1971).

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Transcript of recorded report, Archives C&S, DOH.

⁷⁵ Elwyn A. Smith, telephone interview (May 10, 1990).

⁷⁶ Joseph McCabe, Transcript of recorded report, Archives C&S, DOH.

⁷⁷ Peoples and Conflict in the Middle East—A preliminary Report for Study, pp. 17-f.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-f.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁸³ Raymond V. Kearns, Telephone interview (March 31, 1990).

⁸⁴ James M. Fennelly, Telephone interview (March 22, 1990).

⁸⁵ Elwyn A. Smith to Marc H. Tannenbaum, Letter (June 7, 1972).

⁸⁶ Minutes, Council on C&S (June 19-20, 1972).

⁸⁷ Lewis, interview.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *The Middle East Conflict, A Presbyterian Report* (1974), p. 8.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹⁴ Minutes of the General Assembly, PCUS (1975), pp. 133-ff.

⁹⁵ Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1979) 134, citing speech to Inter Actions Committee, October 12, 1936.

⁹⁶ Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston, South End Press, 1983), p. 134, citing London Sunday Times (June 15, 1969).

⁹⁷ Minutes of the General Assembly UPC (1982), p. 307.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, PC(USA) (1984), pp. 337-ff.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* (1988), pp. 366-ff.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* (1989), p. 614. Before the reunion of the PCUS and the UPC, the Council on Theology and Culture PCUS began a three-part series which was intended to include a study of Christian-Jewish relations, relationships between Christian and Muslim, and a study on the uniqueness of Christ in a religiously pluralist world. The Christian-Muslim paper was adopted by the 1987 General Assembly. The paper on Christian-Jewish relations went to the 1983, 1987, and 1989 General Assemblies and although approved for study in 1987, was never adopted. In retrospect the failure of this latter study to achieve acceptance seems to relate to two theological issues—land and covenant—which were never resolved. In part the failure of this latter study flowed out of the decision to do the third projected study on the uniqueness of Jesus Christ in a religiously pluralistic world after, rather than before the other two studies.

¹⁰¹ Zechariah 4:6 NEB.