On March 3rd, in a startlingly aggressive move, North Korean fighter jets intercepted an Air Force surveillance plane. Though the incident concluded safely, U.S. intelligence officials stated that they expect a continuing series of provocative incidents as North Korea attempts to pressure the Bush Administration while it is getting ready for a probable war with Iraq.

Analysts in the region predict that these sorts of actions will continue because of the annual military exercises taking place this month between the U.S. and South Korea. The North Korean official news agency said that the exercises are “driving the situation to the brink of war” and a “plan of preemptive attack” by the United States. Analysts say the North Koreans’ action have been intentionally forceful in order to show that its military will not roll over in the event of war.

North Korea, an isolated nation with a paranoid leader, is known for its brinkmanship and unpredictability. It has had a tendency toward taking extreme stances before agreeing to talks, so that any concession will be seen as a sign of progress. U.S. intelligence agencies are essentially in agreement that North Korea will not take military actions so extreme as to cause war. The danger, however, when the tensions are running high, is that a mistake will be made that catalyzes a military response.

The Bush Administration is reluctant to engage in direct talks with North Korea, for it does not want to be seen as rewarding bad behavior. While there has been rhetoric to the contrary, the Bush Administration’s preferred strategy with North Korea is isolation. The Administration sees the discovery of the North Koreans’ highly enriched uranium project as proof that the Clinton Administration's strategy of engagement (along with the 1994 Agreed Framework) did not work. Also, the new National Security Strategy— which supports regime change and preemption—has made the Bush Administration’s negotiating position with North Korea extremely rigid and has increased the North’s anxieties.

The Korean War Armistice
In one of its latest attempts to escalate the tensions with the U.S., North Korea has threatened to pull out of the armistice agreement that ended the 1950-53 war. No peace treaty was ever signed to end the hostilities of the Korean War. The armistice, signed on July 27, 1953, is the only agreement that stands between the North and the U.S. recommencing the war.

While it took two years to work out the armistice and have all parties sign on, it was intended to be only a temporary measure until a final peace settlement was achieved. The peace settlement was never resolved. But the armistice agreement provided for the following:

• A suspension of open hostilities,
• A fixed demarcation line with a 2.4-mile-wide buffer zone,
• A mechanism for the transfer of war prisoners,
• A pledge not to execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone (DMZ), The establishment of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to ensure that the truce is held. (The MAC still meets on a regular basis)

North Korean diplomats have said that the armistice is “a blank peace of paper without any effect or significance” because of violations by the United States. The violations listed by the North are the continued naval blockade and the U.S. military buildup on the Korean peninsula, which is in direct violation of the armistice. While the threat is potentially very serious, both sides regularly accuse each other of breaking the truce. In January, South Korea accused the North of being in violation of the truce because of machine guns brought into the buffer zone or DMZ.

The 1994 Agreed Framework
Many claim that the 1994 Agreed Framework, negotiated by the Clinton Administration with North Korea, was a failure because of the recent disclosure by North Korea that it had begun building a new highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear program. (Analysts estimate that it was started in 1997 or 1998.)

In the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to dismantle its graphite nuclear reactors and to remove—and can—spent fuel from their 5-megawatt reactor. In exchange for North Korea’s freeze of its nuclear power plants, the U.S. promised, along with South Korea and Japan, to provide North Korea with two light water nuclear reactors. The United States also agreed to provide annual deliveries of heavy oil to compensate for the energy North Korea would lose while the new reactors were being constructed.

When it was crafted, the Clinton Administration expected that a famine-struck and economically weak North Korea would collapse within a few years. So even though there were reservations about building nuclear power plants in North Korea, the Clinton Administration won bipartisan support.

But North Korea did not implode as was predicted, and each side began accusing each other of failing to abide by all the Agreement’s terms. From North Korea’s perspective, Washington’s failure to move forward on lifting barriers to trade, investment and telecommunications exposed Washington’s lack of commitment to the agreement to work toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

In addition, the March 2002 announcement of the Administration’s new policy of preemption clearly violated the Agreed Framework’s requirement that the U.S. provide formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. From North Korea’s perspective, it cannot trust the U.S. to honor its pledges.

From the viewpoint of the United States, it was suspected that North Korea had enough plutonium before the 1994 freeze to produce one or two bombs. The U.S. also suspected that North Korea possessed undeclared nuclear weapons. So, both sides committed transgressions; one of commission and the other of omission.

But was it a failure?
Many argue with the analysis that the revelation of North Korea’s HEU program proves that giving in to blackmail leads to more blackmail. Many analysts see that view as too simplistic.

In 1994, the United States was on the brink of war with North Korea. The U.S. had increased forces in the region and had installed Patriot missile batteries in South Korea. The Administration was reviewing detailed war plans as well as considering the evacuation of American citizens. Though the Agreed Framework may not have been a success, it was not a failure either. It succeeded in averting a potentially catastrophic war with an estimated one million casualties.

Because of the Framework, Northeast Asia has experienced eight years of stability. Security in the region has increased along with economic growth. In 1994, South Korea ’s GDP was 323 trillion won. Today it is 544 trillion won. China has also experienced extensive growth.

All sides were also given breathing room for new realities to emerge. North Korea has established diplomatic relations with scores of nations, which increases its leverage to strike a deal, and the U.S. may now be able to count on Russia and China to support its position toward North Korea. (See the Foreign Affairs journal, March/April 2003.)

Another benefit of the Framework is the North’s economic dependence on the South. South Korea is now the North’s largest supplier of aid and its second largest trading partner. South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” and North Korea’s economic collapse have given the North a strong economic incentive to avoid war.

What should be done to address the current crisis?
If the situation is resolved using the proper approach, the crisis could be the turning point in one of the world’s most volatile spots.

The options for dealing with such an unpredictable, unstable regime range from the disagreeable to the absurd. If the U.S. is seen as renewing talks and offering economic aid in return for the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program, it could be seen as rewarding bad behavior and could send the message to other states that nuclear weapons are effective tools of political coercion. But increasing threats of military force or economic sanctions could push the volatile regime over the edge and lead to a devastating war.

The trick is to renew talks with North Korea without seeming to reward it for bad behavior. The interested powers (the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia) must officially guarantee the security and stability of the Korean peninsula. And then, a treaty must be brokered in which the North Koreans give up their nuclear power and submit to comprehensive inspections by the IAEA. The Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation recommend the following steps be taken by U.S. policymakers:

• The United States should enter into negotiations with North Korea without giving the appearance of yielding to North Korean demands.
• Bush Administration officials should also avoid harsh rhetoric that would undercut negotiations.
• Congress should not seek to cut or prohibit humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea. Food must not be used as a weapon.
• Congress should consider approving, subject to a Presidential request, special assistance to support a peaceful settlement of the current impasse. It might include funds available for additional humanitarian aid and energy infrastructure assistance, should the President ask for such assistance.
• President Bush should appoint a senior-level official responsible for coordinating policy towards North Korea. (See http://www.clw.org/control/nkpriorities.html)

In light of a nuclear crisis in North Korea which had intensified over the first half of 1994, the danger of war being more imminent, the 206th General Assembly (1994):

• Urges the governments of the United States, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, and the United Nations to resolve peacefully the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula through continued and persistent dialogue and negotiations. The United States and North Korea should continue the high-level talks aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis as well as moving forward with normalization of relations. Sanctions would only serve to escalate the volatile situation and may lead to an unwanted or accidental war. To negotiate does not mean appeasement. The United States has been negotiating with North Korea for only three years out of the past four decades of mutual hostility. Continued negotiations will not hurt. We should remember that a similar crisis in the spring of 1993 was averted by negotiation and a surprise breakthrough in Washington/Pyongyang dialogue.
• Urges the United States government to conclude a peace treaty with North Korea and thus officially end the Korean War. Inasmuch as Korea is still in a state of armistice, a renewed conflict will be a continuation of the Korean War fought in the 1950s. A step toward peace in Korea, and in all of northeast Asia, would be to end officially the Korean War and work to prevent a second Korean War. Reinforcing United States forces in Korea and bringing new armaments only escalates the already volatile situation.
• Urges the United States government to explore the possibility of normalization of diplomatic and trade relations with North Korea. Significant progress has been made during the high-level meetings between Pyongyang and Washington in recent months. North Korea has indicated that they are willing to accept a comprehensive package of incentives, including economic assistance and normalization of relations in exchange for giving up their potential nuclear option. (Minutes, Part I, 1994, p. 580)