by Leon Spencer
Washington Office on Africa

We have come a long way toward peace in Sudan. We have not yet arrived. Pray for peace.

When we last wrote about Sudan, in mid-2002, peace negotiations in Machakos, Kenya, had led to a “protocol” that created a framework for peace. Since then, negotiations have continued, often haltingly, at Nakuru and Naivasha, in the Rift Valley in Kenya.

There, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) extended the cease-fire, and in September, they signed an agreement on one of the most difficult issues of all, security. The United Nations promptly began to prepare for the implementation of a peace agreement, to provide a peace-keeping force and to assist in the return of tens of thousands of refugees and some 3-4 million internally displaced persons.

On October 22nd, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with the negotiators in Kenya, declaring that “the way is now open, it is absolutely clear to me, that the way is now open to a final and comprehensive solution.” It all looks very encouraging.

Developments seem to validate President Bush’s determination in April that “the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue,” something required in the Sudan Peace Act, without which penalties — mainly against the Khartoum government — would have been mandated. The Act also required a peace settlement by October 21st. We obviously don’t have that, but Secretary Powell’s encouraging comments the day after indicate that the United States will take no punitive steps now.

These hopeful signs were sufficient for the Sudanese foreign minister to announce that the U.S. has agreed to lift sanctions and remove Sudan from the list of nations engaged in state-sponsored terrorism. But the United States has made clear that such a decision awaits developments … not just a peace agreement, but a U.S. assessment of Sudan’s cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts in the international arena.

Is peace at hand? Perhaps. The agreement on security arrangements truly is a critical step toward peace, for each side feared that if they weakened their military on the road to peace, and should peace negotiations fail, they would be at a considerable disadvantage. Moreover, since the Khartoum government and the SPLM held diametrically opposing positions on security, the very fact that they have agreed is immensely hopeful.

The gist of the agreement was that they would keep two armies during the interim period, the government’s in the north and the SPLA’s in the south, with some joint units created in border areas, as a step toward a single army. The size of the forces would be reduced.

What remains to be negotiated, however, is both essential and perilous:

• Power-sharing: How do you choose a president and vice-president and ensure representation for both south and north?
• Wealth-sharing: How, especially, are government oil revenues to be divided up?
• Status of the marginal areas: What do you do with the regions seemingly “in-between” north and south, i.e., the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Southern Blue Nile, especially since Abyei is where much of the oil is?

Unity remains a preoccupation for Khartoum. After all, the Machakos Protocol provides for a six-year interim period, at the end of which the southern Sudanese vote on a referendum where self-determination, including secession, may be an option. But keeping all of Sudan intact remains almost non-negotiable among many in the north, which is why Khartoum’s concession to a self-determination referendum remains so contentious, and why every aspect of negotiations is tested against whether it may contribute toward southerners’ choosing to remain in a unified Sudan.

That stance is very challenging for the north. For example, the capital, Khartoum, needs to be a symbol of Sudanese unity, and the proposal before negotiators is for a “capital district” within the city, where offices of the national government are located, with the implication that it would be a “unity” district and would be “sharia free.” This is doubtless a very appealing idea to southerners, but northerners envision the national capital as a city in the north, where Islamic law applies. Some suggest that this issue is serious enough for the Khartoum government to abandon negotiations.

One of the difficulties for those of us with a passion for a just peace in Sudan is that the negotiations are so painstakingly tedious and slow. People walk out. They return. They have no authority and need to consult. They agree. They interpret the agreement in profoundly different ways. They resolve the misunderstandings. And the next issue moves forward on the agenda.

Meanwhile, the tragedy continues for the people of Sudan, especially in the south. Cease-fires break down, and violence continues. In Darfur, military action has recently led some 65,000 Sudanese refugees to flee into Chad. Uganda continues to claim that the Government of Sudan is supporting the rebel movement in Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Despite assurances of humanitarian relief access, some 40 locations for relief were considered “no go” last month. In April the U.N. Commission on Human Rights declined to continue the post of Special Rapporteur for Sudan, yet human rights abuses continue. The Slavery and Abduction Project of the Rift Valley Institute reports that more than 10,000 abductees are still unaccounted for. Additionally, UNICEF says that malnutrition rates have been steadily increasing in southern Sudan since 2001.

Where does this leave us, our witness and our advocacy? Eric Reeves of Smith College has argued passionately that now is the time for the United States to confront the need for transitional aid in Sudan. With some $20 billion in development assistance headed for Iraq, he argues, the U.S. commitment to reconstruction in a post-war Sudan is barely being discussed. It certainly doesn’t appear in the current foreign operations appropriations bill, from which development assistance funds principally come. (Congress may take it up at the beginning of November.)

The House version may provide some money for Sudan, but the funds are minimal, and they are to be shared with Liberia. The needs will be immense: The return of refugees and internally-displaced persons, in the hundreds of thousands, the limited availability of potable water, the dismal condition of health facilities, the need for removal of landmines, for a start. Plus, the Bush Administration has not made clear its support for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Sudan.

And so it may be time for us to be watchful for peace, and to turn our attention towards a fair and sufficient U.S. commitment to post-war Sudan. Anglican and Catholic bishops in Sudan declared in August that “we are accountable before God as the generation to which this moment is offered on behalf of the next generation.” So too are we.

General Assembly

Whereas, the situation of human suffering in Sudan continues to grow because of civil war and the resulting famine, and now exceeds that of Somalia; and

Whereas, more than one million persons have lost their lives to starvation, disease, and war since 1980; and

Whereas, more than five million southern Sudanese have been forced off their land—displaced by the war to northern Sudan, government-controlled cities in the south, and other countries; and…

Whereas, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has maintained its commitment to the two Presbyterian churches in Sudan (that is, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church) for almost a century; and…

Whereas, the Christians of Sudan have urgently entreated our church to actively use every means available to advocate on their behalf before the U.S. government, the United Nations, other international bodies, and the news media;

Therefore, the 205th General Assembly (1993):

Calls on its members, congregations, middle governing bodies, and the Washington Office of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) to respond to the appeal of Sudanese Christians by communicating to elected representatives. (Minutes, 1993, Part I, p. 938)